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Abstract
Slow growth over the last decade has prompted policy attention towards
increasing R&D spending, often via the tax system. We examine the impact
of R&D on firm performance, both by the firm’s own investments and through
positive (and negative) spillovers from other firms. We analyse panel data on
US firms over the last three decades, and allow for time-varying spillovers
in both technology space (knowledge spillover) and product market space
(product market rivalry). We show that the magnitude of R&D spillovers
remains as large in the second decade of the 21st century as it was in the mid
1980s. Since the ratio of the social return to the private return to R&D is about
four to one, this implies that there remains a strong case for public support of
R&D. Positive spillovers appeared to temporarily increase in the 1995–2004
digital technology boom. We also show how these micro estimates relate to
estimates from the endogenous growth literature and give some suggestions
for future work.
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I. Introduction
In the last decade, growth has slowed. In the US, for example, GDP per
hour (labour productivity) growth has averaged a scant 1.4 per cent per year
since 2005, compared with an average of 2.3 per cent from 1950 through
2004.1 One way to try to boost growth is to increase research and development
(R&D) spending, and a popular policy instrument to deliver this is to lower the
cost of R&D through the tax system. Other methods include direct subsidies,
increasing the quantity and quality of the supply of research workers, improving
the system of intellectual property (IP) protection and a host of other methods.
A large literature studies the effects of R&D subsidies and has generally found
positive effects.2
Implicit in the widespread use of government subsidies are the assumptions
that (i) R&D has a positive impact on productivity and (ii) the market will fail
to provide the socially optimal level of R&D spending. This paper investigates
these twin assumptions and also asks whether these have changed over time.
They are crucial in assessing the extent to which policies targeted towards
increasing R&D have potential to efficiently mitigate the growth slowdown.
A key question in determining whether market forces deliver too little (or
too much) R&D from a social perspective is the magnitude and direction of
spillovers. Many theoretical studies have explored the impact of R&D on the
interaction among firms and long-run growth.3 The standard view is that R&D
creates knowledge that cannot be fully appropriated by the firm that paid for
the investment, and so other firms also benefit without paying the full cost.
This partial public good aspect of R&D means that the positive technology
spillovers across firms cause the private return to R&D to lie below the social
return. The system of IP such as patents is designed to address this, but is
highly imperfect in achieving this aim; hence the search for other policy tools
such as direct R&D grants or tax credits.
1These two figures refer to the average annual percentage change in the US Bureau of Labor Statistics
(BLS)’s quarterly series of real output per hour in the non-farm business sector from 2005 through 2018
and from 1950 through 2004, respectively. See https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/OPHNFB.
2See Becker (2015) for a general survey. Microeconomic studies of the effects of R&D tax policies
include, for example: Dechezlepreˆtre et al. (2016) on the effects of UK R&D tax subsidies on R&D
investments, patenting and productivity using a regression discontinuity design; Rao (2016) on the effects
of the US federal R&D tax credit on R&D spending; and Lucking (2019) on the effects of US state R&D
tax credits on employment and productivity growth. Be´rube´ and Mohnen (2009) and Czarnitzki, Hanel
and Rosa (2011) look at the effects of Canadian R&D tax policy on innovation. Studies at the national or
industry level include Bloom, Griffith and Van Reenen (2002), Wilson (2009), Corrado et al. (2015) and
Chang (2018). Griffith, Sandler and Van Reenen (1995) and Griffith, Redding and Van Reenen (2001) have
ex ante policy evaluations for the UK of R&D tax credits. Studies looking at direct R&D grants include
Bronzini and Iachini (2014) and Bronzini and Piselli (2016) on the effects of R&D subsidies in Italy on
R&D spending and patenting.
3See, for example, Spence (1984) or Aghion and Howitt (1992). Keller (2004), Klenow and Rodriguez-
Clare (2005) and Jones (2005) all have surveys of the literature.
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While many empirical studies do support the presence of technology
spillovers, there remains a major problem, which is that R&D generates at
least two distinct types of spillovers. The first is technology (or knowledge)
spillovers, which increase the productivity of other firms that operate in similar
technology areas. The second type of spillover is the product market rivalry
effect of R&D, where innovations take market share from competing firms.
Whereas technology spillovers are beneficial to other firms, R&D by product
market rivals has a negative effect on a firm’s value through ‘business stealing’.
Despite a large amount of theoretical research on product market rivalry
effects of R&D (including patent race models), there has only been limited
econometric work, in large part because it is difficult to distinguish the two
types of spillovers. It is important to identify the empirical magnitude of these
two types of spillovers. If product market rivalry effects dominate technology
spillovers, there may be too much investment in R&D from a social perspective
(an ‘arms race’), so the conventional wisdom that there is underinvestment in
R&D could be overturned. Particular concern has been raised about this in
recent decades due to the apparent ease with which large firms can acquire and
defend their intellectual property.4
One way to address this issue was introduced by Bloom, Schankerman
and Van Reenen (2013; hereafter BSV). Their methodology tries to separately
identify the two types of spillovers from R&D by measuring the closeness
of a pair of firms in technology space compared with product market space.
Technology spillovers are identified from the closeness of firms’ patenting
in similar technological areas, whereas product market rivalry effects are
identified from closeness of firms’ pattern of sales in the multiple four-digit
SIC industries they operate in. The intuition is that R&D by firm A close to firm
B in technology is a boon for firm B. But if firm B uses different technologies
yet competes in the same product market, a boost in firm A’s R&D spending
is bad news for firm B. Using data from publicly listed US firms from the
early 1980s through 2001, BSV found evidence for both technology spillovers
and product market rivalry effects, but argued that the positive R&D spillover
effects dominated. In this paper, we apply the approach using an extra 15 years
of data (through 2015 except for patents, which end in 2006). We look at four
firm outcomes: market value, patenting, productivity and R&D.
We find large positive and statistically significant technology spillovers
and smaller negative product market rivalry effects. In contrast to the earlier
results, we find somewhat stronger evidence of strategic complementarity in
R&D among firms. We use our estimates to conduct a rough welfare analysis
which suggests the marginal social return to R&D exceeds the private return to
R&D by a substantial amount, about 44 percentage points or a factor of about
4For example, Boldrin and Levine (2013).
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four.5 This suggests substantial underinvestment in R&D and an important
role for government support. We then show that our estimates of constant
technology spillovers can be reconciled with semi-endogenous growth models
in which technological innovation is the main driver of economic growth.
We build on a long line of research, perhaps most saliently in the
work of Griliches (1992). BSV introduced a method for splitting up the
two types of spillovers and many authors have subsequently extended this
approach. Manresa (2015) generalises the approach to modelling spillovers
in a modified panel data ‘pooled’ Lasso approach. Lychagin et al. (2016)
take a semi-parametric approach and introduce a third spillover aspect based
on geographical closeness, which they show is independently important.
Colino (2017) adds a dynamic spillover measure that takes into account when
past R&D may create future spillovers using citation information (finding
this particularly important in industries with complex products that build
cumulatively on multiple components). We discuss more papers in the literature
in Section IX on future work.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, in Section II, we
describe the data and measurement of key variables, including the measures
of proximity between firms and the R&D tax credit instrumental variable.
Next, in Section III, we review the econometric framework and theoretical
predictions of the BSV model of firms’ value, production, patenting and R&D.
We then present the main estimation results in Section IV, before investigating
heterogeneity in the coefficients across industries (in Section V) and, most
importantly given our motivation, across time periods (in Section VI).
Section VII conducts a welfare analysis that allows for time-varying parameters
and Section VIII shows how our estimates are consistent with endogenous
growth models and, in particular, with recent papers studying the slowdown
in R&D productivity. Section IX suggests some directions for future research,
before we conclude in Section X.
II. Data
In this section, we discuss the construction of our data set, highlighting where
updates have been made to the BSV data. The complete data set and all
replication files are available online at https://people.stanford.edu/nbloom/
research.
1. Sample construction
We combine three primary data sources to create the analysis sample. First,
data on firm patenting and patent citations are from the National Bureau of
5We estimate the marginal social return at 58 per cent and the marginal private return at 14 per cent.
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Economic Research (NBER) Patent Data Project.6 The NBER patent data
include data from the US Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) on the
universe of utility patents granted between 1976 and 2006 in addition to firm
identifiers (gvkey) which allow the matching of patent data to accounting data
from Compustat. Updates to the NBER patent data allow us to significantly
increase the sample of patenting firms for two reasons. Whereas BSV included
utility patents that had been granted by 1999, recent updates allow us to include
patents granted through 2006. In addition, the NBER’s match of patent assignee
to the Compustat firm identifier ‘gvkey’ has been improved, allowing us to
identify more patenting firms throughout the entire period of analysis. Second,
we use the Compustat Segments database, which breaks down firm sales by
line of business. Each line of business is associated with a primary industry
code (four-digit SIC), and in many cases a secondary industry code. For lines of
business with two codes listed, we allocate 75 per cent of the line’s sales to the
primary industry and 25 per cent to the secondary industry. We use Compustat
Segments data from 1980 through 2015, whereas BSV used Segments data
from 1993 through 2001. Finally, we merge both the patent data and the line of
business data to accounting data (sales, employment, R&D, market value, etc.)
for 1980 through 2015 from the Compustat Fundamentals database. Third, we
draw on the work of Lucking (2019), who extended the database of the tax
rules governing state and federal R&D tax credits through 2015.
2. Measuring technological proximity
Technological proximity is measured using the Jaffe (1986) metric as well as
the Mahalanobis generalisation introduced in BSV. Both measures describe
the correlation of patenting across USPTO technology classes between pairs
of firms. To calculate technological proximity, we first allocate all of the firm’s
patents between 1970 and 2006 into the different USPTO technology classes,
defining for firm i the vector Ti = (Ti1, Ti2, . . . , Ti426), where Tiτ is the share
of firm i’s patents in technology class τ . The Jaffe measure of technological
proximity between firm i and firm j is given by
TECH i j =
(Ti T
′
j )
(Ti T
′
i )
1/2(T j T
′
j )
1/2
.(1)
Hence, TECHij is simply the uncentred correlation of firm i’s patents and firm
j’s patents across technology classes. The pool of technology spillovers to firm
i in year t, SPILLTECHit, is the stock of R&D of all the firms with which firm i
interacts in technology space, weighted by the Jaffe measure of technological
proximity. Specifically,
6https://sites.google.com/site/patentdataproject/Home.
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SPILLTECH i t =
∑
j =i
TECH i j G j t ,(2)
where Gjt is firm j’s stock of R&D in year t.
3. Measuring product market proximity
Product market proximity is measured using line of business data from the
Compustat Segments data set, which provides each firm’s sales disaggregated
by four-digit industry code. We begin by defining the vector Sit = (Si1t,
Si2t, . . . , Si473t), where Sikt is the share of firm i’s sales in industry k from year
t–5 to year t–1. Rather than pool across all years to construct the firm’s industry
sales share, we pool the previous five years of data. Pooling the Segments data
across all 35 years is problematic in this setting. Future industry sales shares
are clearly endogenous as firm innovation and R&D affect subsequent product
market success. Past sales shares do not suffer from endogeneity but will be
mismeasured if firms move in product space over time. While the results in
BSV are robust to using lagged, future or pooled Segments data, our data
cover a much longer period, which likely exacerbates the endogeneity and
measurement problems introduced by pooling the data. We therefore use the
five previous years of firm sales in order to (a) minimise reverse causality
between firm outcomes and product market competition and (b) accurately
measure the firm’s time-t location in product market space.7 Product market
proximity is measured by the correlation of firms’ sales across four-digit
industries:
SICi j =
(Si S
′
j )
(Si S
′
i )
1/2(S j S
′
j )
1/2
.(3)
Similar to the way in which TECHij measures the correlation of two
firms’ patenting across technology classes, SICij is the uncentred correlation
coefficient for firm i and firm j sales across four-digit industries. The pool of
product market spillovers to firm i in year t, SPILLSICit, is then defined as the
stock of R&D of all the firms with which firm i interacts in product market
space, weighted by our measure of product market proximity.8 Specifically,
SPILLSICi t =
∑
j =i
SICi j G j t .(4)
7The results do not appear sensitive to this choice – using the firm’s previous 10 years or 20 years of
sales produces similar estimates.
8We require sufficient variation in firms’ exposure to product market spillovers versus firms’ exposure
to technology spillovers in order to distinguish between the two types of R&D spillovers. Fortunately,
there is substantial independent variation in our measures. The correlation between ln(SPILLTECH) and
ln(SPILLSIC) in our regression sample is 0.4349.
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4. Mahalanobis extension
We also construct alternative versions of SPILLTECH and SPILLSIC using
the Mahalanobis distance metric. This measure allows for spillovers between
different technology classes in the case of the SPILLTECH extension and
between different industries in the case of the SPILLSIC extension. Spillovers
between technology classes and four-digit industries are ruled out by the Jaffe
metric (which assumes full spillovers within the same class or industry and
nothing otherwise). Complete detail on the definition and construction of
the Mahalanobis measures is included in the online appendix. In brief, the
Mahalanobis SPILLTECH measure quantifies spillovers across technology
class by using revealed preference. If two technologies are often located
together in the same firm (for example, ‘computer input/output’ and ‘computer
processing’), then we infer the distance between the technologies is smaller,
so spillovers will be greater. We proxy this by the share of times the two
technology classes are patented within the same firm. The Mahalanobis
SPILLSIC measure is defined analogously for product market spillovers,
allowing for spillovers across four-digit industries whereas the Jaffe SPILLSIC
measure ruled them out. When products within two industries are frequently
sold within the same firm, the Mahalanobis SPILLSIC measure infers that the
distance between these two industries is small.
5. Tax-based instrumental variables
A concern with interpreting the coefficients on the spillover variables as causal
is that they might be subject to various endogeneity biases. For example,
in the total factor productivity (TFP) equation, there may be an unobserved
demand shock for firms operating in a similar technological area that raises
their productivity and R&D together. Following Lucking (2019), we combine
the effective R&D tax credit rates with state corporate income tax credit rates
in order to construct a measure of the cost of R&D in each state. In particular,
we model the cost of R&D as the implicit rental rate for R&D capital services,
which is given by an extension of the Hall and Jorgenson (1967) user cost
formula. We assume a constant interest rate and depreciation rate within each
year, so the depreciation rate of R&D and interest rates are absorbed by the
year dummies after taking logs. Since we include year fixed effects in all of
the empirics, we focus on the log tax component of the user cost, ρst:
ln(ρst ) = ln
(
1− (kst + k
f
t )− (τst + τ
f
t )
1− (τst + τ
f
t )
)
,(5)
where kst and k
f
t are the effective state and federal R&D tax credits, and τst
and τ
f
t are the effective state and federal corporate income tax rates. ρst is
defined at the state-by-year level, but there will also be some within state–year
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variation.9 Hence, we use ρi t as an instrument for own R&D, Git, z
TECH
it =∑
j =i TECH i jρ j t as an instrument for SPILLTECHit and z
SIC
it =
∑
j =i SICi jρ j t
as an instrument for SPILLSICit. Note that the tax instruments are firm-specific
for three reasons. First, the locations of firms’ R&D labs are distributed across
different states. We use the location of inventors as revealed in the patent
documents to estimate each firm’s fraction of R&D activity in each state.10
Large R&D-performing firms will often have research activity in multiple
states. Second, the federal tax system has firm-specific non-linear effects on a
firm’s tax-adjusted user cost of R&D capital.11 Third, the instrumental variables
for spillovers depend on firm-specific proximity measures (TECHij and SICij).
6. Sample and descriptive statistics
To be included in our sample, firms must have segments and accounting data at
some time between 1980 and 2015, and must have applied for a patent at some
point between 1970 and 2006. We also drop firms with less than four years of
TABLE 1
Summary statistics
New sample Old sample
Median Mean SD Median Mean SD
Tobin’s Q 1.67 3.30 4.32 1.41 2.36 2.99
Market value 170 2,692 12,496 412 3,913 16,517
R&D stock 31.6 579 2,614 28.7 605 2,722
R&D stock / capital 0.41 0.95 1.64 0.17 0.47 0.91
R&D flow 5.07 95.4 423 4.36 104 469
Technology spillovers 40,670 54,498 48,722 20,091 25,312 19,942
Product market spillovers 15,650 26,822 31,784 2,007 6,494 10,114
Patent flow 1 25.5 129.3 1 16.2 75.0
Citations-weighted patents 10 210 757 4 116 555
Sales 153 2,351 10,041 456 2,879 8,790
Physical capital 36.5 1,021 4,700 122 1,346 4,720
Employment 1,310 12,819 40,431 3,839 18,379 52,826
Note: The means, medians and standard deviations (SDs) are taken over all non-missing observations
between 1981 and 2001. The left-hand panel presents summary statistics for the new analysis sample, which
contains 1,985 firms. The right-hand panel presents summary statistics for the sample of 705 firms in Bloom,
Schankerman and Van Reenen (2013).
9This arises from two other sources. First, R&D-performing Compustat firms typically have inventors
located in multiple states. We use the location of inventors as detailed on the patents that companies have
filed to proxy for the location of these R&D labs and use these as weights for calculating ρ it. Second, the
rules of the federal tax code create some non-linearities due to firm history (see Hall (1993) and Rao (2016)).
See BSV and Lucking (2019) for more details.
10See BSV for details.
11See Hall (1993), for example.
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data and with large jumps in sales and employment in consecutive years, which
may be indicative of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity. We exclude the
first five years of data (1980–84) from all regressions in order to construct the
knowledge stock measures. Table 1 contains summary statistics for several key
variables for the 1,985 firms in our sample in the left-hand panel and for the
705 firms in the BSV sample in the right-hand panel. Summary statistics are
presented over the period 1981–2001 to facilitate comparison between the two
samples. Compared with BSV, the firms in our sample have higher Tobin’s Q,
are more R&D-intensive (as measured by R&D stock, R&D flow, and stock
scaled by physical capital) and patent more often. Our firms are on average
smaller in terms of market value, sales, physical capital and employment than
the firms in the old BSV sample because the increased matched sample includes
many medium and smaller Compustat firms.
III. Econometric framework
We are interested in estimating the effects of R&D spillovers and product
market rivalry on four firm outcomes: market value, R&D spending,
productivity and citations-weighted patenting. Theory has clear predictions
for firm market value and knowledge, while the predictions for R&D spending
depend on the competitive environment. Market value should be increasing
in the size of the pool of R&D spillovers from technologically similar firms
(SPILLTECH) and decreasing in the size of the pool of spillovers from product
market rivals (SPILLSIC). Knowledge outputs, which we proxy for using
patenting and productivity, should be increasing in the pool of R&D spillovers
from technologically similar firms (SPILLTECH). Lastly, the theoretical
predictions for the effects of spillovers on R&D vary depending on whether
R&D undertaken by firms’ product market rivals is a strategic substitute or a
strategic complement. R&D is increasing in the size of the pool of spillovers
from product market rivals (SPILLSIC) in the case of strategic complements
and decreasing in the case of strategic substitutes. The relationship between
R&D and SPILLTECH is ambiguous in either case because it depends on how
technology spillovers affect the firm’s marginal product of R&D.12
1. Market value equation
We estimate the effect of R&D spillovers on market value in the following
specification:
ln(Qi t ) = γ1φ
[
ln
(
G
A
)
i t−1
]
+ γ2ln(SPILLTECH i t−1)(6)
+ γ3ln(SPILLSICi t−1)+ γ4 X
V
it + η
V
i + τ
V
t + υ
V
it ,
12See BSV for details.
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where Qi t is Tobin’s Q, φ[(
G
A
)
i t−1
] is a function of the lagged R&D
stock divided by the stock of non-R&D assets (which we will approximate
by a sixth-order polynomial), X Vit is a vector of time-varying controls (see
notes to tables for details), and ηVi and τ
V
t are firm and year fixed effects
respectively.
2. Patent equation
We estimate a negative binomial of citations-weighted patents:
Pi t = exp
{
λ1ln(G i t−1)+ λ2ln(SPILLTECH i t−1)(7)
+ λ3ln(SPILLSICi t−1)+ λ4 X
P
it−1 + η
P
i + τ
P
t + υ
P
it
}
,
where Pi t is future citations-weighted patents for firm i’s patents applied for
in year t, G i t−1 is lagged R&D capital stock, and X
P
it−1 contains controls for
lagged citations-weighted patents. The firm fixed effect ηPi is measured as
the pre-sample average citations-weighted patents. One concern with using
citations-weighted patents is that more recently issued patents have had less
time to garner citations than older patents. We address this by including year
fixed effects in all specifications.
3. Productivity equation
The production function is Cobb–Douglas in R&D capital, labour and non-
R&D capital, with additional terms for R&D spillovers:
ln (Yi t ) = ψ1 ln (G i t−1)+ ψ2ln(SPILLTECH i t−1)(8)
+ψ3ln(SPILLSICi t−1)+ ψ4 X
Y
it + η
Y
i + τ
Y
t + υ
Y
it ,
where Yi t is real sales, X
Y
it includes labour and capital, and η
Y
i and τ
Y
t are firm
and year fixed effects respectively.
4. R&D equation
R&D factor demand is
ln
(
R
Y
)
i t
= α2 ln(SPILLTECH i t−1)+ α3ln(SPILLSICi t−1)(9)
+α4 X
R
it + η
R
i + τ
R
t + υ
R
it ,
where Ri t is the flow of R&D spending.
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IV. Results
The estimates of the market value equation are presented in Table 2. All
specifications, in this table and throughout the paper, include year and
firm fixed effects. In column 1, we present the estimates from BSV for
comparison. In column 2, we find a strong positive relationship between
SPILLTECH and market value and a strong negative relationship between
market value and SPILLSIC. R&D by technologically similar firms increases
firm value.13 Conversely, R&D by firms’ product market rivals reduces firm
value. Interestingly, these coefficient estimates are remarkably similar to
those reported in BSV and reproduced in column 1. In columns 3 and 4,
we include only the technology spillover or the product market competition
spillover, and the estimated spillover effects are somewhat smaller, suggesting
the importance of simultaneously controlling for both types of spillover.
Column 5 uses the Mahalanobis metric to measure the distance between
firms in product and technology space. Recall that while the Jaffe measure
TABLE 2
Market value equation
Old
sample
New sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
Jaffe Jaffe Jaffe Jaffe Mahalanobis Jaffe
ln(SPILLTECH) 0.381∗∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.102∗
(0.113) (0.040) (0.040) (0.050) (0.056)
ln(SPILLSIC) –0.083∗∗∗ –0.086∗∗∗ –0.066∗∗∗ –0.135∗∗∗ –0.085∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.013) (0.013) (0.019) (0.023)
ln(R&D/capital) 0.496∗∗ 0.324∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗ 0.331∗∗∗ 0.319∗∗∗ 0.339∗∗∗
(0.069) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.024)
1st stage
F-stat
ln(SPILLTECH) 3,439.1
ln(SPILLSIC) 863.8
Observations 9,944 29,688 29,688 29,688 29,688 26,403
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Tobin’s Q) defined as the market value of equity plus debt, divided by the
stock of fixed capital. All columns include firm and year fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses are
robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation using the Newey–West correction.
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10.
13As described above, we approximate ln(R&D/capital) with a sixth-order polynomial in the regressions
that are reported in Table 2. The ln(R&D/capital) coefficient reported in the table is the implied elasticity of
market value with respect to R&D/capital evaluated at the sample mean R&D/capital ratio. Standard errors
are calculated using the delta method.
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TABLE 3
Patent equation
Old
sample
New sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
Jaffe Jaffe Jaffe Jaffe Mahalanobis Jaffe
ln(SPILLTECH) 0.417∗∗∗ 0.284∗∗∗ 0.259∗∗∗ 0.365∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.043) (0.042) (0.057) (0.044)
ln(SPILLSIC) 0.043 –0.079∗∗∗ –0.038∗ –0.128∗∗∗ –0.087∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.023) (0.022) (0.032) (0.023)
ln(R&D stock) 0.104∗∗∗ 0.170∗∗∗ 0.167∗∗∗ 0.200∗∗∗ 0.174∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.024) (0.027)
ln(patents) 0.420∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.514∗∗∗ 0.537∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015)
Pre-sample FE 0.292∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.143∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
1st stage
F-stat
ln(SPILLTECH) 629.2
ln(SPILLSIC) 216.7
Observations 9,023 21,810 21,810 21,810 21,810 14,789
Note: Dependent variable is citations-weighted patents. Estimation is conducted using the negative binomial
model. Standard errors in parentheses allow for serial correlation through clustering by firm. All columns
include time dummies, four-digit industry dummies and lagged firm sales. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05,
∗p < 0.10.
imposes zero spillovers across different technology classes (industries) for
TECH (SIC), the Mahalanobis metric allows for these inter-class (inter-
industry) spillovers by using the empirical co-patenting (co-sales) rates to
measure the distance between different technology classes (product markets).
Using the Mahalanobis metric increases the coefficient estimates of both
spillovers measures by roughly 60 per cent in absolute magnitude. Finally,
in column 6, we estimate the market value equation using R&D tax credits
to instrument for SPILLTECH and SPILLSIC. While the relationship between
product market spillovers and market value is essentially unchanged compared
with our preferred specification with the Jaffe metric and firm fixed effects in
column 2, the positive association between technology spillovers and market
value falls by two-thirds. This suggests there could be a positive bias, possibly
because market value shocks to a technology sector lead all firms to increase
innovation.
Table 3 displays the estimates of the patent equation. In column 2, we
regress citations-weighted patents (using a negative binomial count data model)
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TABLE 4
Productivity equation
Old
sample
New sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
Jaffe Jaffe Jaffe Jaffe Mahalanobis Jaffe
ln(SPILLTECH) 0.191∗∗∗ 0.236∗∗∗ 0.231∗∗∗ 0.269∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗
(0.046) (0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.027)
ln(SPILLSIC) –0.005 –0.010 0.005 –0.008 –0.010
(0.011) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
ln(capital) 0.154∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
ln(employment) 0.636∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.693∗∗∗ 0.686∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗ 0.694∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
ln(R&D stock) 0.043∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.015∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗∗ 0.016∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
1st stage
F-stat
ln(SPILLTECH) 4,183.7
ln(SPILLSIC) 914.3
Observations 9,935 27,566 27,566 27,566 27,566 27,390
Note: Dependent variable is ln(sales). All columns include firm and year fixed effects and controls for
current and lagged industry sales in each firm’s output industry. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation using the Newey–West correction. ∗∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10.
on our two spillovers measures, the R&D stock, a firm pre-sample fixed
effect (FE) which controls for the firm’s average citations-weighted patents
in the pre-sample period,14 and lagged patents. Unsurprisingly, the coefficient
on ln(R&D stock) confirms that firms with more R&D capital produce
more patents. We find a somewhat smaller positive relationship between
SPILLTECH and patenting compared with BSV, and a negative relationship
between SPILLSIC and patenting in contrast to BSV’s finding of no significant
relationship. Omitting either SPILLSIC in column 3 or SPILLTECH in column
4 attenuates the remaining spillover coefficients slightly. The estimates using
the Mahalanobis measure and the Jaffe measure with instrumental variables
are quantitatively similar to the most general model, in column 2.
Table 4 summarises the estimates of the production function. Comparing
columns 1 and 2, the results on our new sample are similar to the old
14See Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1999) for details. The pre-sample period is defined as the five
years before the firm enters the regression sample.
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TABLE 5
R&D equation
Old
sample
New sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS OLS OLS OLS IV
Jaffe Jaffe Jaffe Mahalanobis Jaffe
ln(SPILLTECH) 0.100 0.125∗∗∗ 0.032∗ 0.093∗∗ 0.198∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.034) (0.019) (0.040) (0.046)
ln(SPILLSIC) 0.083∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.019∗ 0.095∗∗∗ 0.050∗
(0.034) (0.017) (0.010) (0.021) (0.026)
ln(R&D/sales) 0.670∗∗∗
(0.010)
1st stage
F-stat
ln(SPILLTECH) 3,362.2
ln(SPILLSIC) 760.8
Observations 8,579 28,130 27,794 28,130 25,090
Note: Dependent variable is ln(R&D/sales). All columns include firm and year fixed effects and controls for
current and lagged industry sales in each firm’s output industry. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to
arbitrary heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation using the Newey–West correction. ∗∗∗p < 0.01,
∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10.
estimates, although we find slightly larger positive effects of technology
spillovers on productivity. There is no significant relationship between product
market spillovers and productivity, with the coefficient on SPILLSIC estimated
precisely and close to zero. The inputs in production – labour, physical capital
and R&D capital – enter the production function positively and significantly.
The productivity effects are similar when we use the Mahalanobis measure in
column 5 or use tax credit instruments in column 6.
The R&D intensity estimates are summarised in Table 5. We find a
positive relationship between both types of spillovers and R&D intensity.15
In our preferred specification, a 10 per cent increase in SPILLTECH is
associated with a 12.5 per cent increase in R&D intensity, while a 10 per cent
increase in SPILLSIC is associated with a 5.4 per cent increase in R&D
intensity.
In summary, our updated estimates are similar to the findings in BSV with
one exception – our finding in Table 3 of a strong negative relationship between
firm patenting and R&D of the firm’s product market competitors. This can be
15Note that in comparison with the estimates from BSV in column 1, the results on our new sample in
column 2 provide stronger evidence of strategic complementarities in R&D among technologically similar
firms, because of the statistically significant coefficient on SPILLTECH.
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rationalised in a model with endogenous patenting decisions. The intuition is
that R&D by the firm’s competitors reduces the marginal benefit of R&D and
thus the firm’s propensity to patent.16
V. Heterogeneity across sectors
We next explore how our estimates of R&D spillovers vary between
manufacturing versus non-manufacturing firms. One difficulty with this
exercise is that the vast majority of the firms in our sample are in manufacturing,
due to the concentration of R&D and patenting in that sector. Nonetheless we
re-estimate equations 6, 7, 8 and 9 allowing the coefficients to vary by industry
by interacting each variable with a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm is a
manufacturing firm and 0 otherwise. The results are presented in Table A1 in
the online appendix. Almost none of the interaction terms are statistically
significant. On the whole, there is little evidence of heterogeneity in the
estimated spillovers coefficients for manufacturing versus non-manufacturing
firms. Interestingly, the one exception is that there appear to be somewhat
larger technology spillovers to productivity in manufacturing. Estimated R&D
spillovers from technologically close firms to own firm productivity are
35 per cent higher among manufacturing firms than among non-manufacturing
firms, and the difference is statistically significant at the 10 per cent level.17
This may give some empirical justification to the greater attention policymakers
give to manufacturing than to other sectors.
The only other heterogeneity we find evidence of is that the coefficient
on capital in the production function is higher in non-manufacturing. BSV
looked in more detail at heterogeneity between different high-tech sectors.
They found that pharmaceuticals had the largest product market rivalry effects
(compared with computer hardware and medical devices), arguably because
of the importance of ‘me-too’ drugs.
VI. Changes over time in the returns to R&D
In this section, we assess how the spillovers estimates have changed over
time by allowing the coefficients of interest in equations 6, 7, 8 and 9 to vary
over time. This allows us to distinguish between the extent to which changes
in the coefficient estimates are due to changes in the underlying sample and
data versus changes in the nature of spillovers over time. The estimates are
broadly stable over time although there do appear to be some significant
changes in the spillovers parameters around the time of the late 1990s dot-com
16See appendix A.3 in BSV.
17The coefficient on SPILLTECH in the productivity equation is 0.147 while the coefficient on
SPILLTECH interacted with a dummy variable equal to 1 for manufacturing firms is 0.051. 0.051/0.147 =
0.3469.
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TABLE 6
Market value equation
(1) (2) (3)
ln(SPILLTECH) ln(SPILLSIC) ln(R&D/capital)
Baseline (1985  t < 1990) 0.237∗∗∗ –0.081∗∗∗ 0.163∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.014) (0.010)
1990  t < 1995 0.015 0.005 –0.012
(0.017) (0.009) (0.011)
1995  t < 2000 0.115∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗ –0.008
(0.017) (0.009) (0.011)
2000  t < 2005 0.112∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ –0.023∗
(0.020) (0.010) (0.012)
2005  t < 2010 0.014 0.006 –0.044∗∗∗
(0.023) (0.012) (0.014)
2010  t  2015 –0.014 –0.014 –0.061∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.012) (0.013)
Note: Dependent variable is ln(Tobin’s Q) defined as the market value of equity plus debt, divided by the
stock of fixed capital. This table summarises the results of a single regression. Specifically, it reports the
coefficients from allowing the coefficients on ln(SPILLTECH), ln(SPILLSIC) and ln(R&D/capital) in the
specification in column 2 of Table 2 to vary over time. Column 1 reports the estimates for the coefficient
on ln(SPILLTECH), which are allowed to vary between five-year time frames. Columns 2 and 3 report the
estimates of the coefficients on ln(SPILLSIC) and ln(R&D/capital) in each five-year period, respectively.
Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation
using the Newey–West correction. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10. Note that the ‘baseline’ is the
linear term (so represents 1985–90) and the interactions are in separate rows, so the marginal effect in any
particular year is the sum of the baseline and the relevant interaction (for example, the elasticity between
market value and SPILLTECH in the 1990–95 period is estimated to be 0.2522 = 0.2372 + 0.0150).
boom and some evidence of changes in the returns to R&D in recent years.
In the following paragraphs, we discuss the estimates from each equation in
turn.
In Table 6, we assess how the R&D coefficients have changed over time in
the market value regressions. We re-estimate equation 6 and interact dummy
variables for each five-year period with the technology spillover variable,
the product market spillover variable and firm R&D/capital.18 Columns 1,
2 and 3 show the time-varying estimates of the coefficient on technology
spillovers, product market spillovers and R&D/capital, respectively. Note that
the period 1985–89 is the omitted base, so the coefficients in each row are
the additional effects in each five-year block. For example, in column 1, the
elasticity between market value and SPILLTECH in the 1990–95 period is
estimated to be 0.2522 (= 0.2372+0.015) and the elasticity between market
18For this exercise, we only include the first-order term of firm R&D/capital, omitting the higher-order
terms in equation 6. Including the second- through sixth-order terms with each of the five-year time period
dummies would require estimating an additional 30 coefficients.
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TABLE 7
Patent equation
(1) (2) (3)
ln(SPILLTECH) ln(SPILLSIC) ln(R&D stock)
Baseline (1985  t < 1990) 0.182∗∗∗ –0.075∗∗ 0.161∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.032) (0.026)
1990  t < 1995 0.067 0.065∗∗ –0.032∗
(0.059) (0.032) (0.019)
1995  t < 2000 0.226∗∗∗ –0.032 –0.020
(0.077) (0.032) (0.020)
2000  t  2005 0.131∗ –0.064∗ 0.095∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.035) (0.022)
Note: Dependent variable is citations-weighted patents. Estimation is conducted using the negative binomial
model. This table summarises the results of a single regression. Specifically, it reports the coefficients from
allowing the coefficients on ln(SPILLTECH), ln(SPILLSIC) and ln(R&D stock) in the specification in column
2 of Table 3 to vary over time. Column 1 reports the estimates for the coefficient on ln(SPILLTECH), which
are allowed to vary between five-year time frames. Columns 2 and 3 report the estimates of the coefficients
on ln(SPILLSIC) and ln(R&D stock) in each five-year period, respectively. Standard errors in parentheses
allow for serial correlation through clustering by firm. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10. Note that the
‘baseline’ is the linear term (so represents 1985–90) and the interactions are in separate rows, so the marginal
effect in any particular year is the sum of the baseline and the relevant interaction.
value and SPILLSIC is –0.0763 (= –0.0813+0.005). Looking over Table 6 as
a whole, estimated technology spillovers and product market rivalry effects
in columns 1 and 2 are quite stable over time, with one notable exception.
Positive technology spillovers were 48 per cent larger and negative product
market rivalry effects 38 per cent smaller on average during the 10 years
encompassing the dot-com boom of 1997–2001.19 Before and after the dot-
com boom, the estimates are very flat and we find no statistically significant
changes in the spillovers estimates over time. In contrast to the stable estimates
of spillovers, the coefficients on own firm R&D appear to be decreasing over
time, especially in the last 15 years of the sample. The coefficient on own R&D
is 14 per cent lower in 2000–04 compared with 1985–89, and the difference is
significant at the 10 per cent level. In the next five years (from 2005 to 2009)
the estimated returns are 27 per cent lower and in the last five years (from 2010
to 2015) they are 37 per cent lower, with both differences again relative to the
1985–89 estimates and significant at the 1 per cent level.
Table 7 allows the coefficients in the patent equation to vary over time. The
results in this table also suggest higher knowledge spillovers and lower product
market rivalry effects from 1995 to 2004. However, since our patent data set
19For technology spillovers: 0.5 × (0.115 + 0.112) / 0.237 = 0.479. For product market rivalry: 0.5 ×
(0.019 + 0.042) / 0.081 = 0.377.
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TABLE 8
Productivity equation
(1) (2) (3)
ln(SPILLTECH) ln(SPILLSIC) ln(R&D stock)
Baseline (1985  t < 1990) 0.206∗∗∗ –0.016∗∗ 0.008∗
(0.022) (0.007) (0.005)
1990  t < 1995 0.008 0.012∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.008) (0.004) (0.003)
1995  t < 2000 0.021∗∗ 0.010∗∗ 0.004
(0.009) (0.004) (0.003)
2000  t < 2005 –0.006 0.019∗∗∗ 0.013∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.005) (0.0003)
2005  t < 2010 –0.009 0.021∗∗∗ 0.010∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.005) (0.004)
2010  t  2015 –0.010 0.014∗∗ 0.009∗∗
(0.012) (0.006) (0.004)
Note: Dependent variable is ln(sales). This table summarises the results of a single regression. Specifically,
it reports the coefficients from allowing the coefficients on ln(SPILLTECH), ln(SPILLSIC) and ln(R&D
stock) in the specification in column 2 of Table 4 to vary over time. Column 1 reports the estimates for
the coefficient on ln(SPILLTECH), which are allowed to vary between five-year time frames. Columns 2
and 3 report the estimates of the coefficients on ln(SPILLSIC) and ln(R&D stock) in each five-year period,
respectively. Standard errors in parentheses are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and first-order serial
correlation using the Newey–West correction. ∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10. Note that the ‘baseline’
is the linear term (so represents 1985–90) and the interactions are in separate rows, so the marginal effect
in any particular year is the sum of the baseline and the relevant interaction.
ends in 2006, it is difficult to identify trends in the estimated coefficients, and
more so to distinguish between a possibly temporary relationship during the
dot-com boom versus a longer-term trend.
The time-varying estimates for the productivity equation are presented in
Table 8. Again the estimates are reasonably stable over time. In contrast to
the market value equation, there is much less evidence of an effect of the dot-
com boom on estimated technology spillovers. Aside from a small statistically
significant increase for 1995–99, we find no change in the technology spillovers
parameter over time. The estimate of the coefficient on ln(SPILLSIC) is
also quite stable over time. Except for the first five years of the sample
(1985–89), the estimated coefficient on ln(SPILLSIC) is always statistically
indistinguishable from zero. The own R&D coefficients do not show the same
decline as they did for market value – if anything, they are getting larger in
later years.
Finally, we examine how the estimates of the R&D equation have changed
over time in Table 9. In contrast to the earlier results, the coefficients on
ln(SPILLTECH) and ln(SPILLSIC) do appear to be trending over the past
30 years. In particular, the estimated coefficient on ln(SPILLTECH) has
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TABLE 9
R&D equation
(1) (2)
ln(SPILLTECH) ln(SPILLSIC)
Baseline (1985  t < 1990) 0.138∗∗∗ 0.025
(0.037) (0.017)
1990  t < 1995 –0.028∗ 0.003
(0.015) (0.008)
1995  t < 2000 –0.040∗∗ 0.018∗∗
(0.018) (0.009)
2000  t < 2005 –0.025 0.042∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.009)
2005  t < 2010 –0.063∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.010)
2010  t  2015 –0.097∗∗∗ 0.059∗∗∗
(0.022) (0.011)
Note: Dependent variable is ln(R&D/sales). This table summarises the results of a single regression.
Specifically, it reports the coefficients from allowing the coefficients on ln(SPILLTECH) and ln(SPILLSIC)
in the specification in column 2 of Table 5 to vary over time. Column 1 reports the estimates for the
coefficient on ln(SPILLTECH), which are allowed to vary between five-year time frames. Column 2 reports
the estimates of the coefficients on ln(SPILLSIC) in each five-year period. Standard errors in parentheses
are robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity and first-order serial correlation using the Newey–West correction.
∗∗∗p < 0.01, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗p < 0.10. Note that the ‘baseline’ is the linear term (so represents 1985–90) and
the interactions are in separate rows, so the marginal effect in any particular year is the sum of the baseline
and the relevant interaction.
decreased over the sample, especially in the past 10 years. Indeed, in the last five
years of the sample, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the coefficient on
ln(SPILLTECH) is equal to zero. Conversely, the coefficient on ln(SPILLSIC)
has been trending up over time, suggesting greater strategic complementarity.
There is no statistically significant relationship between ln(SPILLSIC) and
own R&D from 1985 through 1994, while from 1995 through 2015 we do find
evidence of positive and increasing strategic complementarity of R&D among
product market rivals.
To summarise the results from this section, the estimates of technology and
product market spillovers have been reasonably stable for the past 30 years. For
1995–2005, we find greater technology spillovers and smaller negative product
market spillovers. This is strongest in the market value equation regressions
with ln(Tobin’s Q) as the dependent variable, but present in the patent and
productivity equations as well. Our interpretation is that this reflects the market
exuberance for high-R&D firms around the time of the dot-com boom. Finally,
we also see increasing strategic complementarities in R&D among product
market rivals getting larger over time.
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VII. Welfare implications
What do these estimates imply about the marginal social return to R&D? We
conduct a simple welfare analysis as in BSV to determine how the updated
results affect estimates of the marginal private return (MPR) to R&D and the
marginal social return (MSR). The marginal private return measures the change
in firm output due to an increase in firm R&D, and the marginal social return
measures the change in aggregate output due to an increase in firm R&D.
Under certain simplifying assumptions,20 BSV show that we can calculate the
marginal private return as
MPR =
Y
G
(ψ1 − σYγ1),(10)
where Y/G is the ratio of output to the R&D stock, σY is the share of the
reduction in market value that is due to a decline in output as opposed to a
decline in price and is assumed to be one-half, γ1 is the elasticity of market
value with respect to product market rivalry (SPILLSIC) andψ1 is the elasticity
of output with respect to the own R&D stock.
Similarly, the marginal social return can be calculated as
MSR =
Y
G
(ψ1 + ψ2),(11)
where ψ2 is the elasticity of output with respect to technology spillovers
(SPILLTECH). The formula for MSR captures the effect of increasing R&D
on the firm’s own output through ψ1 and its effect on other firms through ψ2.
Evaluating the marginal social return at the median ratio of output to R&D
stock (2.345), MSR = 2.345 × (0.015 + 0.231) = 0.577, or 57.7 per cent.
Similarly, the marginal private return evaluated at the median ratio of output
to R&D stock is MPR = 2.345 × {0.015 – 0.5 × (–0.086)} = 0.136, or
13.6 per cent. That is, we find that under this simple calculation, the social
return to R&D greatly exceeds the private return, by 44.1 percentage points or
a ratio of four to one. This implies a substantial underinvestment in R&D from
a social perspective.21
20Specifically, if all firms are the same in terms of their sales and R&D stock, all firms have the same
linkages with other firms in technology and product market spaces, and the coefficients estimated in the
previous sections are causal.
21Compared with the results in BSV, we find a similar marginal social return (57.7 per cent versus
55.0 per cent) and a smaller private return (13.6 per cent versus 20.7 per cent). The smaller private return
is due to a smaller output elasticity with respect to R&D capital (ψ1) as our estimate of the elasticity of
market value with respect to product market rivalry (γ 1) is very similar to the original results. Meanwhile,
our estimate of a very similar social return to R&D reflects the fact that our lower estimate of ψ1 is closely
offset by the higher estimated output elasticity with respect to technology spillovers (ψ2).
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FIGURE 1
Marginal social and marginal private returns to R&D,
evaluated using aggregate data
0.0 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.4 
0.5 
0.6 
0.7 
0.8 
0.9 
1.0 
1.1 
Marginal Social Return Marginal Private Return 
Note: The solid line plots the estimated marginal social return to R&D (MSR), which is calculated as
Y
G
(ψ1 + ψ2), where Y/G is the ratio of output to the R&D stock, ψ1 is the elasticity of production with
respect to the R&D stock and ψ2 is the elasticity of production with respect to the technology spillovers. The
dashed line plots the estimated marginal private return to R&D (MPR), which is calculated as Y
G
(ψ1 − σYγ1),
where Y/G is the ratio of output to the R&D stock, ψ1 is the elasticity of production with respect to the
R&D stock, γ1 is the elasticity of market value with respect to product market rivalry and σY is the share
of the reduction in market value that is due to a decline in output as opposed to a decline in price. σY is
assumed to be one-half, ψ1 and ψ2 are estimated in Table 8 and γ1 is estimated in Table 6. The figure uses
OECD data on US GDP divided by total business R&D in the US as the estimate of Y/G. Dotted lines
represent 95 per cent confidence intervals.
We can also analyse how the marginal social return and marginal private
return to R&D have changed over time using our time-varying estimates of
the spillovers coefficients from Tables 6–9. Figure 1 plots the evolution of the
MSR and MPR from 1985 through 2015. The solid black line shows the MSR
setting Y/G to GDP divided by the aggregate business R&D stock. The MSR
is similar in 2015, at around 0.61, to its value of 0.64 at the beginning of our
sample in 1985. In between these years, it rose briefly in the early 1990s but
then dipped back to its previous level at the end of the 1990s. The dashed
line plots the evolution of the MPR over the same period, again setting Y/G
equal to GDP divided by the aggregate business R&D stock. This measure is
relatively flat as well, although it is somewhat larger in 2015, at 0.18, than in
1985, at 0.15. This largely reflects an increase in the MPR during the first half
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of the 2000s, before and after which the MPR changed little. Overall, there is
no strong pattern upwards or downwards for either of the two series and we
conclude that both the MSR and the MPR have been broadly stable over this
30-year period.22
Note that the MSR is equal to the sum of the production elasticities ψ1
and ψ2 divided by the R&D stock as a share of output. Similarly, the MPR
is a function of estimated elasticities and the R&D stock as a share of output.
In calculating the marginal social return and the marginal private return in
Figure 1, we have used the aggregate ratio of US business enterprise R&D
(BERD) stock to GDP (from OECD data). We now consider an alternative
estimate of the R&D stock as a share of output – namely, the median R&D
FIGURE 2
Marginal social and marginal private returns to R&D,
evaluated at Compustat medians
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Note: The solid line plots the estimated marginal social return to R&D (MSR), which is calculated as
Y
G
(ψ1 + ψ2), where Y/G is the ratio of output to the R&D stock, ψ1 is the elasticity of production with
respect to the R&D stock and ψ2 is the elasticity of production with respect to the technology spillovers. The
dashed line plots the estimated marginal private return to R&D (MPR), which is calculated as Y
G
(ψ1 − σYγ1),
where Y/G is the ratio of output to the R&D stock, ψ1 is the elasticity of production with respect to the
R&D stock, γ1 is the elasticity of market value with respect to product market rivalry and σY is the share
of the reduction in market value that is due to a decline in output as opposed to a decline in price. σY is
assumed to be one-half, ψ1 and ψ2 are estimated in Table 8 and γ1 is estimated in Table 6. The figure
uses the median sales to R&D ratio in our sample of Compustat firms as the estimate of Y/G. Dotted lines
represent 95 per cent confidence intervals.
22The dotted lines around each series represent bootstrapped 95 per cent confidence intervals.
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to sales ratio in our sample of Compustat firms. On the one hand, this is a
natural choice as it is an accurate measure for the sample of firms on which we
have estimated the spillovers parameters, with the median chosen to reduce the
influence of outlier firms. On the other hand, our sample necessarily contains
R&D-intensive, publicly listed firms and so using this perhaps unrepresentative
measure of changes in the R&D stock to output ratio over time may lead us
to mischaracterise the evolution of the MSR.23 Figure 2 plots the evolution of
the MSR and MPR from 1985 through 2015 using the median R&D to sales
ratio in our sample of Compustat firms as the estimate of the R&D stock to
output ratio. The solid black line plots the MSR, which is estimated to be 0.57
in 2015 compared with 0.64 in 1985. This reflects a decline in the MSR during
the 1990s and a rise in the following 15 years. The MPR is also largely stable
from 1985 to 2015, rising from about 0.15 in 1985 to around 0.17 in 2015.
The evolution of the MPR in Figure 2 is similar to the evolution of the MSR
– the plot reveals a decline during the 1990s and a subsequent increase during
the 2000s and early 2010s. We conclude that using either estimate of the R&D
stock to output ratio, the marginal social and marginal private returns to
R&D in 2015 are quite similar to their levels 30 years earlier.
VIII. Relationship with endogenous growth models
An interesting question is how our estimates of R&D spillovers relate to those
in standard endogenous growth models. Bloom et al. (2017) note that many
new growth models can be described by a steady state or ideas growth equation
of the form
A˙
A
= piR,(12)
where these are economy-wide values. This implies that ideas growth A˙/A
is proportional to a measure of research effort R.24 pi can be thought of as
a measure of research productivity – it is the degree to which an absolute
given amount of research effort translates into growth. These models imply
that constant research effort should lead to constant exponential growth.
Unfortunately, equation 12 is not easily reconcilable with the data as the
23There are many differences between the two measures in addition to using the median versus the
(weighted) mean. First, BERD is based on R&D conducted in the US regardless of whether it is by US-
listed firms or foreign branches of multinationals. Compustat R&D is the global amount of R&D by a
US-listed firm even if this is conducted overseas. Second, BERD includes firms that are not publicly listed.
Third, the exact definitions vary, with Compustat based on GAAP accounting regulations and BERD based
on the OECD’s Frascati Manual definition. Fourth, whereas a firm’s Compustat R&D is publicly available,
the firm-level data from BERD surveys are not publicly available.
24For example, in Romer (1990), what is defined here as R is called HA, or ‘total human capital employed
in research’.
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number of US researchers has increased substantially over time whereas US
TFP growth rates have not. Alternatively, semi-endogenous growth models25
allow for diminishing returns to research productivity (β  0 in equation 13):
A˙
A
= αA−β R.(13)
The pure endogenous growth model26 is when β = 0 so pi = α.27
In our framework, the ideas stock is given by the aggregate R&D
knowledge stock, which is a combination of firm-level G and the aggregation
of SPILLTECH. The economy-wide production function can be written
Y = Aσ K 1−βL LβL(14)
where L is labour, K is capital, βL is the output elasticity with respect to labour
and 0 < σ  1. The marginal social return to the R&D knowledge stock is
dY
d A
= σ
Y
A
.(15)
If we assume that, at the aggregate level, there is little depreciation of
the knowledge stock, research effort R can be thought of as the change in
the economy’s knowledge stock, A˙.28 The change in the ideas stock is then
simply
A˙ = R,(16)
which implies that the growth rate of ideas is
gA =
A˙
A
=
R
A
(17)
or
A =
R
gA
.(18)
25For example, Jones (1995) and Kortum (1997).
26For example, Romer (1990).
27Note that we could change R in equation 13 to Rλ where 0 < λ  1, to allow for ‘stepping on toes’
effects of duplicative research, but we keep to λ = 1 for simplicity due to the disagreement in the literature
about what an appropriate value should be (see Bloom et al. (2017) for a discussion).
28The private knowledge stock is likely to depreciate as firms copy each other and old R&D is made
obsolete. But as Griliches (1992) argued, the social knowledge stock depreciation will be substantially lower
and possibly zero.
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Substituting this expression for A back into the formula for MSR (equation 15)
gives
dY
d A
= σ
gA
(R/Y )
.(19)
Equation 19 shows that the MSR is determined by the degree of diminishing
returns to the ideas stock (σ ), the fundamental growth rate of new ideas (gA,
which in semi-endogenous growth models is not affected by R&D in the
long run) and the R&D to output ratio (R/Y ). A more general derivation
of equation 19 is in Jones and Williams (1998) – see their equation 16 for
example.
Our finding of a broadly stable social return to R&D in the last three decades
(see Figures 1 and 2) is consistent with the broad stability of the objects on
the right-hand side of equation 19. This conclusion might seem surprising in
the light of the evidence in Bloom et al. (2017) that research productivity as
measured by pi in equation 12 has been declining over time. But this evidence
is consistent with what we would expect when growth can be described by
equation 13 and β ≈ 1, as research productivity, pit , is falling over time as At
grows. Growth would have slowed by a lot more had R stayed constant, but in
fact R/Y has stayed broadly constant, which is the same as saying R&D has
risen as the economy has grown and this offsets the fall in pi . This conclusion
echoes Jones and Williams (1998), who showed the consistency between the
social returns estimates in the micro productivity literature (which we broadly
follow) and more formal macro endogenous growth models (as investigated in
Bloom et al. (2017)).29
IX. Some directions for future research
There are many important future research areas in the realm of R&D spillovers.
First, and perhaps most exciting, is explicitly linking R&D spillovers to
work coming out of the economics and econometrics of network theory.30
The technology distance metrics we have implemented for building the R&D
network are one example of ways to build up a lattice of potential knowledge
‘donors’. But there are many other ways to do this. This raises profound
questions of how to causally identify the impact of changes in innovative
behaviour in one node of the network on other nodes and also what determines
29Jones and Williams (1998) show how the kind of social returns to R&D estimates built from an R&D-
augmented Cobb–Douglas production function like equation 8 relate to the formal semi-endogenous growth
models reflected in equation 13. In short, a log-linearised approximation of the production function for ideas
(equation 13) around the steady-state growth path can be mapped into our estimate of the social rate of
return.
30For example, Jackson (2010).
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how these networks evolve over time. These are generic problems in the area
of peer effects and much progress has recently been made.31
This discussion leads naturally on to a second class of issues, which is how
to empirically measure the relevant dimension of spillovers. We have focused
on patent technology class and national product markets. The patent data
themselves offer many other options using citations information (the closer we
are, the more I cite you), claims information or legal disputes. Customers and
supplier chains are another dimension: this could be in goods, services or the
technology market. Consider the last aspect, for example. There are many IP
transactions to do with selling patents, cross-licensing arrangements, research
joint ventures (RJVs) etc. which reveal cross-firm linkages.32 Some data sets
are emerging that do have the details of these technological contracts and these
could be used in a more careful way to distinguish whether or not a firm is
partially paying for the benefits of another firm’s R&D.33 Another important
dimension of spillovers is geographic distance – there is much evidence that
people and firms learn more from others who are geographically close, and
this is one of the reasons for agglomeration effects.34 It is straightforward to
extend the distance metric approach in this paper to incorporate geography as
another proximity dimension alongside technology class and product market.35
Geographic spillovers are particularly interesting in terms of place-based
policies that seek to reinvigorate places that have been ‘left behind’ over
the last few decades – for example, trying to foster growth through universities
and technology hubs.36
A third avenue for future research is to think more internationally. In this
paper, we focus on domestic US spillovers, which is natural as America
remains the technological leader in more industries than any other country.
It would, however, be fascinating to see to what extent the findings here
generalise to other regions such as Europe, Japan or China. Doing so would
also raise another question of international spillovers – we should really
31For example, Acemoglu, Akcigit and Kerr (2016).
32These IP deals are generally unobserved in the standard firm-level data sets such as the Compustat data
used in this paper. Technological spillovers are still in principle identified, however. Take our market value
equation, for example. If the licensing costs represent the full value derived by firm A from the increase
in (technologically close) firm B’s R&D, then firm B’s R&D will not increase firm A’s value (as these
will already be incorporated into the market’s assessment). Any increase in firm A’s value is that over and
above the financial payments to firm B and thus should be scored as a spillover. Similar arguments hold in
production functions when value added (or its equivalent) is the outcome, as these licensing payments are
intermediate inputs that are not part of value added. This is not so clear in the patent equation, however, as
technological licensing is not directly netted out, but could be controlled for with some accounting variables.
33For example, Galasso and Schankerman (2016).
34See Moretti (2013).
35See Lychagin et al. (2016) for an extensive treatment.
36For example, Gruber and Johnson (2019) and Kantor and Whalley (2019).
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also be building in more rigorously how firms absorb knowledge from other
countries.37
Finally, the theoretical basis of empirical studies of spillovers tends to
be very simple. A new wave of endogenous growth models taking firm
heterogeneity seriously are starting to be developed and structurally estimated
on richer data sets than the one we have used here (for example, using
census-type data matched to the Business R&D and Innovation Survey
(BRDIS)). The advantage of this approach is that the ‘deep’ parameters can
be recovered in principle and used to estimate counterfactuals, welfare and
policy simulations.38 These models are much more demanding, but are clearly
an ambitious new frontier in the area of R&D spillovers.
X. Conclusion
Innovation is at the heart of growth, so policies to boost R&D, such as tax
credits, could be useful in restoring stronger productivity growth rates in
advanced countries. This paper implements a framework to examine the impact
of R&D on firm performance. The database is an extension of the one in Bloom,
Schankerman and Van Reenen (2013) adding up to an additional 15 years of
data. The updated estimates have broad similarity to the original findings but
some differences – for example, stronger strategic complementarity of R&D
investments. As in the earlier work, we show that there are large positive
spillovers among technologically close firms, and negative spillovers from
product market rivals due to business-stealing effects. Back-of-the-envelope
welfare calculations confirm the earlier paper’s findings of a sizeable wedge
between the social and private returns to R&D, suggesting $4 of social benefit
to every $1 of R&D spent.
The additional data also allow us to explore the changing natures of
technology and product market spillovers over time. Perhaps surprisingly,
we find that estimated spillovers are reasonably stable over the three decades
we study. There are several exceptions, most notably elevated technology
spillovers around the time of the dot-com boom of 1997–2001 which may
reflect market enthusiasm for R&D-intensive firms. Finally, we show how our
framework for estimating welfare implications of R&D spillovers, in which we
find a roughly constant marginal social return to R&D over the past 30 years,
can be reconciled within the framework of a standard semi-endogenous growth
model.
Although the evidence here does suggest that greater public policy support
for R&D is justified, it does not tell us exactly what the precise form of policy
37Compustat partially does this as the R&D activities are by global multinationals, much of whose
activities are outside the US but captured in the consolidated accounts. Furthermore, many of the US stock
market listed firms used in Compustat are headquartered outside the US.
38For example, Akcigit and Kerr (2018).
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intervention should be. One option is through the tax system and, in line
with the previous literature, we do find that R&D tax credits are effective in
raising firm-level R&D spending. However, tax credits or more direct R&D
subsidies through industrial grants may both have a bigger influence on the
price of R&D (mainly wages of R&D researchers) than on the volume of
R&D if the supply of researchers is inelastic. This motivates policies that may
act on the supply side of R&D through increasing the quantity and quality
of potential inventors. This may be through increasing the number of students
studying science, technology, engineering and maths (STEM subjects) or more
radically by increasing the exposure of individuals from low-income families,
minorities and women to the chance of becoming a future inventor.39,40
Supporting information
Additional supporting information may be found online in the Supporting
Information section at the end of the article.
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